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PROMOTING INNOVATION WHILE PREVENTING
DISCRIMINATION: POLICY GOALS FOR THE SCORED
SOCIETY
Frank Pasquale* & Danielle Keats Citron **
Professor Zarsky’s response 1 is an erudite and thoughtful analysis of
the discrimination concerns raised by our article, The Scored Society. 2
We particularly appreciate his connection of themes in our article with
literature on discrimination law. This historical awareness and
theoretical sophistication demonstrates the deep continuity between our
concerns and those of other legal scholars.
Professor Zarsky has led us to realize that there are in fact several
normative theories of jurisprudence supporting our critique of the scored
society, which complement the social theory and political economy
presented in our article. In this response, we clarify our
antidiscrimination argument while showing that is only one of many
bases for the critique of scoring practices. The concerns raised by Big
Data may exceed the capacity of extant legal doctrines. Addressing the
potential injustice may require the hard work of legal reform.
Before responding, though, we should acknowledge Professor
Zarsky’s contributions to the field, and explain how we believe our work
advances inquiry along some of the trails he has blazed with his
insightful analyses of data mining, privacy, and information law
generally.
Professor Zarsky has done a great deal to explore the legal problems
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Yale Information Society Project.
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Lois K. Macht Research Professor & Professor of Law, University of Maryland Francis King
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1. Tal Z. Zarsky, Understanding Discrimination in the Scored Society, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1375
(2014).
2. Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated
Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2014).
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raised by the proliferation of networked identities and selves. We are all
aware of the freedoms and dangers posed by pseudonyms, anonymous
handles, and multiple roles online. 3 Viewed in light of Professor
Zarsky’s proposals about traceable anonymity to ensure accountability in
a digital age, one can think of the scores explored in our article as deeply
connected to those concerns: quantified identities imposed on
individuals, often without their consultation, consent, or even awareness.
An attention economy has gradually developed on the internet, as
companies collect information about the habits and demographics of
those who visit their websites. Unlike the old broadcast model of simply
exchanging programming content for (an easily avoided) obligation to
watch commercials, the new online data collectors enjoy far greater
powers to monitor the behavior and actions of users and to influence
their online experience and reputation. The skillful use of that data is a
large part of the success of online behemoths and is increasingly driving
decisionmaking at companies ranging from banks to retailers.
But data collection and analysis raises serious concerns. Data
collection practices range from the careful to the careless. The tradeoff
between checking accuracy and speedy production can easily tilt toward
the latter as competition increases. 4 Once primarily directed at
marketing, data collection practices now figure into employment and
credit opportunities. 5 The companies’ digital stockpiles would delight a
new Stasi or J. Edgar Hoover. Assurances to customers that data are
anonymized mean little without audits—which are nonexistent for most
firms, and rare and often cursory even when required. Should a company
that observes a customer looking at a $10,000 ring on one site use that
information to allow others to systematically raise prices for the
customer on the assumption that he or she is wealthy?
What self-help measures can (and should) consumers take as they are
observed online? Can contract and tort law address all of the potential
violations of privacy that occur due to interferences with our settled
expectations about how our data is used? Can law address the harms

3. DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 27–28, 57–62, 222–25 (2014)
(exploring the promise and perils of online anonymity, including cyber harassment, and calling for
anonymity as a default privilege that can be lost).
4. Natasha Singer, When Your Data Wanders to Places You’ve Never Been, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28,
2013, at BU3; Shannon Pettypiece & Jordan Robertson, Did You Know You Had Diabetes? It’s All
Over the Internet, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 11, 2014, 1:07 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/201409-11/how-big-data-peers-inside-your-medicine-chest.html.
5. Frank Pasquale, Op-Ed., The Dark Market for Personal Data, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2014, at
A27.
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associated with data leaks due to insecure systems? 6 The collection of
vast reservoirs of data raises difficult questions across the range of
public and private, and statutory and common, law.
Professor Zarsky’s essay Privacy and Data Collection in Virtual
Worlds was an early effort to tackle these problems. 7 The term “virtual
world” is usually associated with game-like activity in venues like
Second Life or World of Warcraft. But the metaphor of the virtual world
helps enrich our understanding of the degrees of freedom available to the
legal system as it addresses questions like privacy and identity online.
Professor Zarsky highlighted the vast extent of personal information that
can be collected in virtual worlds. He discussed the heightened level of
surveillance prevalent in the online environment. In our era of pervasive
surveillance, tracking, and the internet of things, that world is our world,
and its most gifted explicators have given us important insights into how
pervasive data-gathering and processing should be governed. 8
While many laissez-faire commenters have claimed that users can
“take or leave” participation in virtual worlds if they find such
surveillance oppressive, Professor Zarsky early on realized how many
important activities are migrating to these virtual spaces and how
individual user decisions are constrained. For example, someone opting
out of Second Life, and creating their own “Third Life,” might well find
that none of his friends follow him to his own virtual world, and that the
creators of Second Life sue for copyright and trademark infringement to
the extent the newer virtual world mimics their own. Those trying to
defect to the alternative social networks Google+ and Ello have
experienced this coordination problem directly: maybe they and some
enterprising friends establish a presence there, only to find that ninety
percent of the rest of their social network is too busy or uninterested to
join them. Technical and practical challenges to creating a user
experience sufficiently similar to attract users of the Second Life
interface, while sufficiently different to avoid infringing intellectual
property, may well be insuperable.
To deal with these dynamics, Professor Zarsky has recognized that
6. See generally Danielle Keats Citron, Reservoirs of Danger: The Evolution of Public and
Private Law at the Dawn of the Information Age, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 241 (2007).
7. Tal Z. Zarsky, Privacy and Data Collection in Virtual Worlds, in THE STATE OF PLAY: LAW,
GAMES, AND VIRTUAL WORLDS 217 (Jack M. Balkin & Beth Simone Noveck eds., 2006).
8. Bernard E. Harcourt, Digital Security in the Expository Society: Spectacle, Surveillance, and
Exhibition in the Neoliberal Age of Big Data 13 (Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory
Working Paper Grp., Paper No. 14-404, 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2455223; see also David Gray & Danielle Keats Citron, The Right to Quantitative
Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 62 (2013).
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TOSs and EULAs are, by and large, contracts of adhesion, and that only
a public law solution can address the imbalances inevitable in these
contracts, which in most cases amount to little more than private
legislation of terms by the dominant party. We agree. Regulatory
initiatives are essential to guard consumers who can hardly anticipate all
potential uses of data on their own.
Professor Zarsky’s attention to threats to the sensitive online ecology
of social software continued in his work Law and Online Social
Networks. 9 He analyzed the positive and negative social effects of
interactions in these environments. Professor Zarsky is one of the first
scholars to notice the importance of gaming in social networks—efforts
to manipulate or fake the bonds of trust that create social capital and
cooperation. We believe that, unregulated, scoring could lead to exactly
the same issues: people pervasively manipulating their own identities to
gain monetary or other advantages. 10
Professor Zarsky has balanced two sets of competing demands on
legal scholars in technologically cutting-edge fields. While a principle of
subsidiarity recommends market- and contract-based remedies for many
wrongs that can happen on these networks, problems of “astroturf” (i.e.,
commodified and artificial support) and manipulation can probably only
be addressed via dedicated entities with the technical expertise to patrol
against them. One must simultaneously understand and engage with new
technical developments unanticipated by lawmakers, and try to identify
the issues that will recur as future developments supersede present
controversies. Professor Zarsky masterfully balanced these imperatives
in Law and Online Social Networks, both comprehending the new
opportunities for distributed information creation generated by social
networks, and isolating the core issues of gaming and authentication that
will prove nettlesome in virtually any foreseeable instantiation of social
software. The law of consumer scoring still has to grapple with both
issues. 11
As reflected in his response to us, Professor Zarsky recognizes the
limits of legal solutions to the challenges of the scored society. In his

9. Tal Z. Zarsky, Law and Online Social Networks: Mapping the Challenges and Promises of
User-Generated Information Flows, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 741 (2008).
10. Frank Pasquale, Facebook’s Model Users, NEW CRITICALS (July 6, 2014),
http://www.newcriticals.com/facebooks-model-users/print.
11. PAM DIXON & ROBERT GELLMAN, WORLD PRIVACY FORUM, THE SCORING OF AMERICA:
HOW SECRET CONSUMER SCORES THREATEN YOUR PRIVACY AND YOUR FUTURE (2014), available
at http://www.worldprivacyforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/WPF_Scoring_of_America_Ap
ril2014_fs.pdf.
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reflections on anonymity, transparency, and pseudonymity in Thinking
Outside the Box, 12 he meticulously detailed the inevitable tradeoffs that
occur online in tracking individual action—tradeoffs policymakers will
have to consider as they weigh the virtues and vices of requiring better
data collection practices by scorers. With this appreciation of Professor
Zarsky’s work, we have now set the stage for responding on mutually
agreeable normative foundations to the incisive analysis he has offered
to enrich our own.
I.

EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IS IMPERILED DUE TO THE
SCORING OF POLITICAL EXPRESSION

In his response, Professor Zarsky focuses on how scoring may have a
negative impact on traditionally protected groups, such as racial
minorities. 13 He observes that, at least in the United States, the Supreme
Court is not disposed to include many more such groups under the
protection of the Fourteenth Amendment. Existing state constitutional
law and statutory law, however, is not so confined. Civil rights
protections can and do reach newly recognized disadvantaged groups,
including sexual minorities. 14 We look forward to learning more about
how other countries might take a more flexible approach.
However, our concerns about scoring extend beyond the protections
afforded traditionally disadvantaged groups from a constitutional or
statutory perspective. The key to understanding the menace of scoring in
a modern, Big Data economy is the volume, velocity, and variety of
information that could be fed into a score. 15 The legal academy is still
catching up to the shocking empirical findings of security researchers,
privacy law scholars, and computer scientists. To take only one example,
Pam Dixon and Robert Gellman have unearthed thousands of scoring

12. Tal Z. Zarsky, Thinking Outside the Box: Considering Transparency, Anonymity, and
Pseudonymity as Overall Solutions to the Problems in Information Privacy in the Internet Society,
58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 991 (2004).
13. For other thoughtful work on the potential for antidiscrimination law in troubling uses of Big
Data, see Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact (Oct. 19, 2014)
(unpublished), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2477899.
14. Some states extend civil rights protections not only to racial and religious minorities but also
to people targeted due to their gender and sexual orientation. See, e.g., Kathleen W. Mikkelson,
California’s Civil and Criminal Laws Pertaining to Hate Crimes, OFF. OF ATT’Y GEN. OF CAL.,
http://oag.ca.gov/civil/htm/laws (updated Feb. 25, 1999).
15. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES, PRESERVING
VALUES 4 (2014), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/big_data_privacy
_report_5.1.14_final_print.pdf.
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systems. Outsiders have no idea what is going into many of them. 16 And
yet these scores could become decisive in contexts ranging from
employment to insurance to marketing and beyond.
Our article was an effort to challenge the presumption of benign,
targeted scoring. The Big Data economy is premised on the
accumulation of massive amounts of data, and it is all but certain that
some of it will be sensitive data or will be pieced together to make
derogatory inferences. Just as the ever-declining price of surveillance
and the pervasiveness of sensor networks have revolutionized Fourth
Amendment law, the very cheapness of data requires us to rethink
privacy law. Professor Zarsky mentions the possibility that there are
already lists of Muslim and Jewish individuals in commercial databases.
Add to that lists of gay individuals, Democrats, Republicans, Socialist
Party supporters, breast cancer survivors, Alcohol Anonymous
participants, fans of mixed martial arts, Krav Maga members, violent
video game addicts, and literally millions of other categories.
It is one thing to go through life with a sense that authorities may be
able to scrutinize all of one’s data in the context of criminal
investigations or intelligence gathering. We addressed the deep concerns
such surveillance raises in our article Network Accountability for the
Domestic Intelligence Apparatus 17—a piece that the Snowden
revelations now show to be prescient in terms of the dark possibilities it
raised but that we could not entirely confirm in 2011. With the leaks of
governmental insiders, we have proof that pervasive, continuous, and
totalizing surveillance is the order of the day.
That said, it is quite another matter, and in many respects the more
chilling extension of surveillance, to understand that one’s data is being
processed in literally thousands of scores that cannot be reviewed,
understood, or challenged. “Do I dare retweet the #Ferguson hashtag,
lest some future employer score that as an indicator of rebelliousness?” a
person may reasonably ask herself. “Are there risks in calling Edward
Snowden a whistleblower, lest that suggest an anti-government agenda?”
is another question that is reasonable for social media participants to ask
themselves.
Until we have much better knowledge of scoring practices, and quite
possibly until we have law explicitly restricting employers from basing
hiring, firing, and promotion decisions on generalized assumptions based

16. DIXON & GELLMAN, supra note 11, at 7.
17. Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, Network Accountability for the Domestic
Intelligence Apparatus, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1441 (2010–2011).
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on political expression, a troubling burden on expressive freedom will
persist.
Whatever the current state of First Amendment doctrine, a regime of
total surveillance undermines the free development of personality upon
which free expression depends. 18 The power to watch is the power to
attack, embarrass, and destroy reputations. As Professor Daniel J. Solove
shows, privacy is not just a problem of concealing isolated facts. 19 Of
great concern is the collection and analysis of a critical mass of data. Our
lives are starting to become an open book for those powerful or rich
enough to score our profiles.
We need to think of privacy as being as much a vindication of our
First Amendment as our Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. 20 Professor
Marc Jonathan Blitz has explored the intersection of free speech and
privacy values. 21 Will individuals hesitate to join mental illness support
groups on Facebook, once they are aware that an ever-growing array of
body or mind scores may be used against her? Will they refrain from
“liking” fringe political groups on Facebook, once they realize that their
affiliations on social media are ending up in scores that can have a
detriment on their careers?
The technological tools for matching digital records are staggering.
State restrictions on the use of that data (and scores based on it) can be
an important step toward giving individuals a chance to form and
express opinions and affiliations in peace—without fearing an endlessly
ramifying series of classifications made and opportunities possibly
denied, on account of faceless and secretive data miners.
II.

PRIVACY AND POSITIVE-SUM INNOVATION: MUTUALLY
REINFORCING GOALS

A balanced and thoughtful reconciliation of the interests of data
brokers, data subjects, scorers, and users of data and scores is important.
We do not want to unduly burden a nascent industry. But we should also
realize that privacy and innovation are mutually reinforcing constructs
when, as in our case, critical aspects of privacy protection require the
18. See JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE, AND THE PLAY OF
EVERYDAY PRACTICE (2012) (on dangers of modulation).
19. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, NOTHING TO HIDE: THE FALSE TRADEOFF BETWEEN PRIVACY AND
SECURITY (2011).
20. See Daniel J. Solove, The First Amendment as Criminal Procedure, 112 N.Y.U. L. REV. 112,
114–15 (2007).
21. Marc Jonathan Blitz, Stanley in Cyberspace: Why the Privacy Protection of the First
Amendment Should Be More Like That of the Fourth, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 357, 359 (2010–2011).
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validation of the data used. In reliable Big Data science, researchers
invest a great deal of time and effort in cleaning up data, assuring that it
is actually accurate and verifiable. 22 In commercial contexts where
opportunities and livelihoods are at stake, the case for assuring data
integrity applies a fortiori.
Moreover, there is now an opportunity to shape scoring systems
toward positive-sum innovation, as opposed to ever more baroque
strategies of discrimination. Pam Dixon has accused firms of using
“vulnerability-based marketing” to target consumers. 23 In one disturbing
example, marketers were urged to place ads at times of the day when
women felt worst about themselves. 24 In another, consumers were
unaware that lead generators for credit were selling their names to the
“highest bidder,” including firms more than ready to charge nearusurious interest rates. 25 The U.S. Public Interest Research Group (U.S.
PIRG) correctly argues:
[S]ome of the non-transparent, deceptive pages you are led to on
the Internet when you type “I need a loan,” may appear to be
lenders, but aren’t. These websites are actually “lead
generators,” that ask you a few questions to determine your
value and then auction you off to the highest bidder, often an
online payday lender or for-profit school. Lead generators are
the target of numerous enforcement inquiries, including by New
York. . . . [I]f the protections offered by a regulated prescreening
system for financial marketing are diluted by a switch to scores
generated using largely unregulated Internet algorithms created
through the sharing of cookies and all these other tracking bits
between and among a vast interconnected network of businessto-business firms that consumers don’t know about or do
business with, consumers will be harmed. 26
22. Steve Lohr, For Data Scientists, “Janitor Work” Is Hurdle to Insights, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18,
2014, at B4.
23. See WPF’s Data Broker Testimony Results in New Congressional Letters to Data Brokers
PRIVACY
F.
(Feb.
3,
2014),
about
Vulnerability-Based
Marketing,
WORLD
http://www.worldprivacyforum.org/2014/02/wpfs-data-broker-testimony-results-in-newcongressional-letters-to-data-brokers-regarding-vulnerability-based-marketing/.
24. Lucia Moses, Marketers Should Take Note of When Women Feel Least Attractive: What
Messages to Convey and When to Send Them, ADWEEK (Oct. 2, 2013, 6:44 AM),
http://www.adweek.com/news/advertising-branding/marketers-should-take-note-when-women-feelleast-attractive-152753.
25. Ed Mierzwinski, We Join FTC Event on Big Data E-Scores, U.S. PIRG EDUC. FUND (Mar.
19, 2014), http://www.uspirgedfund.org/blogs/eds-blog/usp/we-join-ftc-event-big-data-e-scores.
26. Id.; see also Ed Mierzwinski & Jeff Chester, Selling Consumers Not Lists: The New World of
Digital Decision-Making and the Role of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 46 SUFFOLK L. REV. 845,
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The National Consumer Law Center has concluded that, at least so far,
Big Data has been a “big disappointment” for scoring creditworthiness. 27
We also should be worried about misdirection of the innovation of
scoring in the employment context—particularly if firms can effectively
hide misconduct via scores. Existing laws prohibit some discriminatory
uses of the data. For example, an employer cannot fire workers simply
because they have an illness. But Big Data methods are able to predict
diabetes from a totally innocuous data set (including items like eating
habits, drugstore visits, magazine subscriptions, and the like). And the
analyst involved, whether inside or outside the firm, could easily mask
the use of health-predictive information.
For example, a firm could conclude a worker is likely to be diabetic
and that she is likely to be a “high cost worker” given the significant
monthly costs of diabetic medical care. Given the proprietary nature of
the information involved, the most the firm is going to tell the fired (or
unhired) worker is the end result: the data predicted that her cost to the
firm was likely to be greater than the value she produced. Most of the
time, companies need not even offer that rationale. Unexplained and
unchallengeable, Big Data becomes a star chamber.
We do not have to put up with this stigmatic profiling. State
legislatures should require employers to reveal to employees all the
databases of information used to make judgments about them. If we do
not get that access, we may never know why key decisions are made.
And secrecy is a discriminator’s best friend: unknown unfairness can
never be challenged, let alone corrected. 28 Without mandating privacyrespecting innovation, new technology can be abused in order to hide
(and ultimately promote) discrimination, rather than to promote truly
productive innovation.

846 (2013).
27. NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., BIG DATA: A BIG DISAPPOINTMENT FOR SCORING CONSUMER
CREDIT RISK (2014), available at http://www.nclc.org/issues/big-data.html.
28. It is already difficult to challenge discrimination in hiring practices, for example. The
Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in a case where Abercrombie & Fitch refused to hire a
young Muslim woman because her hijab did not comport with the company’s “Look Policy.” The
Tenth Circuit held that even though the woman would have been entitled to a religious
accommodation under Title VII, the company’s decision not to hire her did not violate the law
because she never provided explicit notice that she would require such an accommodation. See
Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 731 F.3d 1106 (10th Cir.
2014), cert. granted, 83 U.S.L.W. 3089 (U.S. Oct. 2, 2014) (No. 14-86).
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III. CALIBRATING A POLICY RESPONSE
Professor Zarsky is correct to say that the scope and level of
protections afforded to individuals should vary depending on the degree
of harm suffered. He raises important empirical questions about the level
of harm that we should expect in areas like marketing and insurance.
The policy response should also be calibrated with respect to
characteristics of the scoring systems at issue.
Consider, for instance, the following chart:
Opaque
Opaque Data
Data,
& Algorithms,
Algorithms, & Transparent
Outputs
Outputs

Opaque Data,
Transparent
Algorithms
& Outputs

Transparent
Data,
Algorithms,
& Outputs

Unrevisable
Judgment,
Unreformable
System

1

2

3

4

Revisable
Judgment,
Unreformable
System

5

6

7

8

Unrevisable
Judgment,
Reformable
System

9

10

11

12

Revisable
Judgment,
Reformable
System

13

14

15

16

The primary targets for legal reform should be the systems associated
with the boxes in the upper, left-hand corner in the chart above. The
lower, right-hand corner brings us closer to a zone of technological due
process. There is a far greater chance of competition in scenarios 4, 8,
12, and 16 than when some critical aspect of the scoring process is kept
secret. But even if multiple open systems are competing, we should still
have some concerns if, as in scenario 4, they generate unrevisable
judgments, and refuse to open themselves up to the possibility of reform
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in response to the concerns of scored individuals.
IV. PROBLEMATIC ASSUMPTIONS
We should also note that Professor Zarsky does assume away some of
the problems that worried us. 29 He assumes that scores “are premised
upon the individuals’ previous behaviors, rely upon non-spurious
correlations between individual attributes and problematic behaviors the
process is trying to predict. (A default, a risk, or poor work performance
are some key examples).” 30
However, we are concerned about many situations where scores are
premised on false or distorted accounts of individual behavior. Consider
two different examples. Let’s first assess credit reports. Millions of
Americans have errors on their credit reports. Credit reporting is one of
the most highly regulated, perhaps the most highly regulated, data
gathering used for scoring. In nearly all other types of scoring,
individuals do not know that the scoring is done, how the data is
gathered, what data is fed into the relevant algorithms, the nature of
these algorithms, or the effect of the scoring. 31
Now, let’s turn to analytics firms that crunch data to search for and
assess talent in particular fields. 32 Remarkable Hire scores a job
candidate’s talents by looking at how others rate his or her online
contributions. 33 Talent Bin and Gild create lists of potential hires based
on online data. 34 Big-name companies like Facebook, Wal-Mart, and
Amazon use these technologies to find and recruit job candidates. 35 Will
algorithms give high scores to individuals who have been harassed
online with defamation, threats, and the posting of nude photos that have
either been stolen from their online accounts or exposed in violation of
their trust? Will they identify harassed individuals as top picks for
employment if those targeted individuals have withdrawn from online
life? Will they discount online abuse so that victims can be evaluated on
their merits rather than the falsehoods and privacy invasions spread by
their harassers? One can only guess the answers to these questions, but

29. Zarsky, supra note 1, at 1383 (“[T]he following discussion is premised upon several nontrivial assumptions regarding the scoring process.”).
30. Id.
31. See DIXON & GELLMAN, supra note 11.
32. Matt Richtel, I Was Discovered By An Algorithm, N.Y. TIMES, April 28, 2013, at BU1.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
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our bet is that the falsehoods will hold sway.
Thus, one of our key policy proposals: those harboring significant
amounts of data ought to have some certified indication of its
provenance. Such certifications should be regularly audited. Data should
not be allowed to persist without certification of its provenance and
accuracy. Until those types of protection are in place, it is in the state’s
interest to tightly regulate the transfer of health data, much of which the
state itself required to be created.
Professor Zarsky also assumes that “the scoring schemes structured
by statisticians in the back office are indeed followed to a tee by those in
the field.” 36 Unfortunately, if the U.S. experience is any indication,
precisely the opposite may often be the case. As one finance expert has
observed, “the more complex the algorithm, the more opportunities it
provides to the salespeople to ‘game’ and arbitrage the system in order
to commit fraud.” 37 Promoted as a road to opportunity, the aspiration to
price credit according to scores has had a darker side. Abuses quickly
piled up, as “some large financial institutions peddled mortgages to
people who could not possibly pay the monthly rates.” 38 Subprimestructured finance generated enormous fees for middlemen and those
with “big short” positions, while delivering financial ruin to many endpurchasers of mortgage-backed securities and millions of homebuyers. 39
In conclusion, we are happy to have had this opportunity to further
develop and clarify our views in response to Professor Zarsky. His work
has inspired important research in cyberlaw. We take his
recommendations seriously as we and other scholars pursue a research
agenda to address Big Data’s perils for disadvantaged groups.

36. Zarsky, supra note 1, at 1384.
37. Ashwin Parameswaran, How to Commit Fraud and Get Away With It: A Guide for CEOs,
MACRORESILIENCE (Dec. 4, 2013, 4:19 PM), http://www.macroresilience.com/2013/12/04/how-tocommit-fraud-and-get-away-with-it-a-guide-for-ceos/.
38. MARGARET ATWOOD, PAYBACK: DEBT AND THE SHADOW SIDE OF WEALTH 8 (2008).
39. See MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT (2010); JENNIFER TAUB, OTHER PEOPLE’S HOUSES:
HOW DECADES OF BAILOUTS, CAPTIVE REGULATORS, AND TOXIC BANKERS MADE HOME
MORTGAGES A THRILLING BUSINESS (2014); Robert Brenner, What Is Good for Goldman Sachs Is
Good for America: The Origins of the Current Crisis (2009), available at
http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/0sg0782h.

